Twentieth Century Chronicle

Page 234

The ensuing meeting confirmed Zheng Rucheng's premonition. After a few pleasantries, Lin Xinyi, the liaison officer for the Japanese Navy, raised a question unrelated to the military exercises: "Actually, besides discussing the military exercises with you as the representative of the Japanese Navy, I also want to discuss with the representatives of China and North Korea how to properly resolve some of the current conflicts between the three countries in the marine fishing industry..."

The question raised by Lin Xinyi actually concerns the fact that after Japan defeated Russia at sea, Japanese fishermen began to cross traditional maritime boundaries and enter the coastal waters of former Russia, Korea, and China.

Japanese fishermen's transboundary fishing serves two purposes. First, it aims to meet the needs of the domestic Japanese market, as urbanization in Japan has led to a rise in demand for meat, and marine resources are clearly better suited to satisfy Japan's rapidly growing need for non-staple foods. Second, it seeks to compete for the Chinese market, fishing in Chinese coastal waters and then selling to China, which not only avoids significant taxes but also gains access to a new market.

Because of Japan's maritime advantages and its industrialization, Japanese fishermen, or rather Japanese fishing companies, have a greater technological advantage than individual fishermen from China and North Korea, which has led to increasing conflicts between the two sides.

At first, Zheng Rucheng thought that the Japanese wanted to use the military exercise as an opportunity to put pressure on China, since North Korea was already under Japanese control and there was no need for negotiations.

However, just as he was trying to stop Lin Hsin-yi, saying that fisheries disputes were a matter for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather than the Navy, Lin Hsin-yi objected, saying: "Disputes between fishermen should of course be resolved through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but I think the maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones between countries are issues that the Navy should be concerned with. If the navies of the three parties cannot reach a compromise on this issue, then the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot solve this problem."

Lin Xinyi's words were supported by Li Yuanhong and An Minggen. They believed that setting aside fishing disputes and instead demarcating maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones was a negotiable proposition. They argued that refusing to discuss these issues would only embolden Japanese fishermen to encroach on traditional fishing grounds of China and South Korea, ultimately creating more disputes. After all, China and North Korea currently lack the maritime power to confront the Japanese navy, meaning their maritime law enforcement rights cannot be recognized by the Japanese navy.

Regardless of the outcome of the negotiations, at least it will provide some protection for our own fishermen, thus establishing a judicial system for disputes among fishermen from the three countries. After listening to Lin Xinyi's proposal, Zheng Rucheng also changed his mind from opposition to support. After the meeting, he reported to Yuan Shikai: "I think the Japanese proposal to establish an exclusive economic zone is indeed necessary, because this proposal is not for Japanese fishermen to obtain fishing rights in Korea and our coastal waters, but to ensure that the three countries have a consistent way of dividing maritime interests."

Yuan Shikai asked with some surprise, "You said that the Japanese proposal to establish an exclusive economic zone would actually restrain Japanese fishermen from encroaching on Korea and our traditional fishing grounds. So why would the Japanese make such a thankless suggestion?"

Zheng Rucheng, being a graduate of the Royal Naval College, Greenwich, had already grasped the intention behind Lin Xinyi's proposal. Therefore, he explained to Yuan Shikai without hesitation: "The Japanese probably want to establish a new maritime order in East Asia. Once the concept of the exclusive economic zone is formed, Japan can use this rule to resolve maritime disputes with the great powers."

In name, Japan exercised self-restraint towards my country and Korea. However, the formation of this new order also signified that the Japanese Navy had officially become a defender of this new order, enabling them to begin resisting the expansionist tendencies of other powers in Asia. This was similar to the intention behind the North Sea fishing rights agreement between the British Navy and the Dutch.

After the establishment of maritime order in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asia became Japan's safe zone, allowing the Japanese navy to confidently expand into the Pacific and southern seas.

Yuan Shikai asked with some disbelief, "I know about the Japanese ambitions, but do they really have the ambition to confront the great powers? They defeated the Russians only with the support of the British and Americans, not with their own strength."

Zheng Rucheng cautiously replied, "Japan's national strength is naturally no match for that of countries like Britain and France. That's why the Japanese are trying to establish a new order in Northeast Asia first, and then spread this new order to the rest of Asia. As long as all countries recognize this new order, it means that the Japanese navy will have a certain say in Asian affairs..."

Chapter 744

Author: Fuchun Mountain Residence Number: 4948 Comments: 0 Update Date: 2023-09-22 12:29:11

Yuan Shikai did not oppose negotiating with the Japanese on exclusive economic zones at sea, because the Beiyang government had actually suffered the most. Although the Japanese had ceded Dalian and Lushun, Japanese fishermen had sailed their fishing boats to the mouth of the Bohai Sea and competed with Chinese fishermen for fishing grounds. After all, the development of the Tianjin area had greatly increased the region's consumption power. After fishing in the Bohai Sea, Japanese fishermen could quickly smuggle their catch into Tianjin through Chinese merchants and sell it as Chinese fish.

Those who can sail fishing boats to the mouth of the Bohai Sea are not individual fishermen, but Japanese fishing companies supported by Japanese capital. Their purpose is to make money, not to transport fish resources from Chinese fishing grounds back to Japan. After all, the Japanese themselves cannot consume such a large amount of fish.

Japan's industrialization has had a remarkable impact on its fisheries. With the acquisition of more modern vessels and fishing gear, Japan's annual marine catch has grown extremely rapidly, exceeding the growth rate of the Japanese fish consumption market. As a result, fishing near the continental shelf and selling the catch locally has become a new hotspot for Japanese fishing companies.

Although Japanese fishing companies are only slightly more advanced than individual fishermen, this is the difference between modern industrial organization and small-scale individual farming. Individual fishermen cannot compete with fishing companies at all, especially during the fishing season. Fishing companies usually dominate the fishing grounds to increase efficiency and prevent individual fishermen from entering their fishing areas.

This domineering behavior naturally aroused dissatisfaction among Chinese fishermen, because they had never encountered such industrialized operations before. For individual fishermen, the fishing season meant that everyone had to rely on their own abilities. If your catch was not as good as others, it was a matter of luck and skill. But you can't drive people away and occupy a piece of sea for yourself. This obviously goes against tradition.

Before the invention of steamships and radio, maritime operations were entirely dependent on the weather. People at sea needed to help each other to overcome difficulties. Therefore, traditional maritime operations emphasized the spirit of mutual assistance. Without mutual assistance, if you lost your way at sea and lost your water and food, you could only wait to die.

Fishery companies organized using an industrial model prioritize fishing efficiency, so they cannot allow individual fishing boats to drift in their operating areas and obstruct their work. Furthermore, since Japan and China are not part of the same country, this conflict between individual fishermen and fishery companies quickly escalated into a diplomatic issue between nations.

Yuan Shikai needed the support of the Japanese government, so he naturally advocated suppressing the discontent of his own fishermen and exonerating Japanese fishing boats. However, this leniency towards Japanese fishing boats not only failed to provoke self-restraint from the Japanese, but also spurred Japanese fishing companies to further expand their operations in the waters near China. At the same time, the criticism of Beiyang by fishermen and the media grew louder, with people believing that Beiyang was a remnant of the Qing Dynasty and acted no differently than the Qing court of the past.

Without Wuhan as a competitor, Yuan Shikai would naturally not have cared about these negative comments. After all, fishermen and intellectuals didn't have guns, so their criticisms wouldn't have hurt him. However, with Wuhan as a competitor, criticisms of him and the Beiyang government would turn into praise for the Wuhan regime, which was obviously detrimental to the Beiyang government's rule.

On the surface, the upheaval in the Northwest this time was due to the sudden death of Yang Shixiang, which disrupted the power structure in the Northwest and allowed local forces in the Northwest and Wuhan to take the opportunity to expel the Beiyang forces from the Northwest. However, in reality, it was because the Beiyang's rule in the Northwest was unpopular. It could not gain the support of either the Han people or the ethnic minorities. Yang Shixiang only managed to maintain the Beiyang's rule in the Northwest by virtue of his status in the Qing Dynasty, the military strength of the Beiyang, and his personal talent.

This kind of local power, built on the strength of individuals, naturally vanished with the death of the strongman. Therefore, when local forces and Wuhan launched their uprising, there was no local support for the Beiyang government to return to the Northwest. In fact, there were more supporters of the former Qing dynasty than for the Beiyang government. After all, the former Qing dynasty still held a legitimate status, while the Beiyang government was not considered a legitimate dynasty at all.

Yuan Shikai knew that if this situation continued, the Beiyang government would probably lose its basic territory in the north. Although he hoped to get help from Japan, he did not want to become the Guangxu Emperor under Japanese control. Moreover, Japan's strength was far inferior to that of other powers. It was just that other powers were unwilling to increase their investment in him, only the Japanese dared to. Otherwise, he would have naturally clung to the thighs of Britain and Germany, rather than the arm of Japan.

After discussing with Zheng Rucheng for most of the day, Yuan Shikai still couldn't see any traps in the negotiations proposed by the Japanese navy. He felt that it was better to wait and see. Although Japan's intention might be to use the new East Asian order to increase its voice in Asia, what did that have to do with China? China could simply remain silent and let Japan do as it pleased.

With the Beiyang government observing the situation and the active cooperation of Wuhan and North Korea, Lin Xinyi quickly initialed an agreement with the representatives of China and North Korea: it stipulated the standards for exclusive economic zones, established a trilateral maritime arbitration tribunal to handle maritime civil disputes among the three countries, and discussed the establishment of a maritime law enforcement and rescue team involving the three countries to enforce the law and rescue ships in distress in the fishing grounds and public waters of East Asia.

The draft agreement was quickly approved by the Chinese parliament, but it encountered obstacles in both North Korea and Japan. The most vocal opponents in North Korea were the officials of the Resident-General's Office, who believed that the agreement would clarify North Korea's national sovereignty and would be detrimental to Japan's policy of annexing North Korea.

Meanwhile, officials in the Japanese cabinet, including those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, believed that the navy's actions exceeded its authority and infringed upon the Ministry's independent diplomatic rights. Some politicians in the Japanese parliament were also quite dissatisfied after seeing the draft, believing that the navy had made too many concessions in the negotiations and had not protected the interests of Japanese fishermen at all.

This led to a strange phenomenon: Japan, which first proposed the trilateral negotiations on the exclusive economic zone, was now threatening to withdraw from the negotiations, while China strongly supported the concept of the exclusive economic zone and decided to negotiate not only with Japan and North Korea, but also with Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries.

Despite facing unfavorable public opinion in China regarding his proposal, Lin Xinyi remained undeterred. He continued to engage in deeper communication with the Chinese Navy, laying the groundwork for the establishment of a trilateral maritime law enforcement team. This maritime law enforcement team represents the initial stage of building an Asian joint fleet; proposing such a team from the outset would inevitably provoke suspicion from the Chinese Navy and concern from other powers.

The naval leadership understood the purpose of Hayashi Shinji's negotiations, and they would naturally insist on pushing forward the negotiations on the exclusive economic zones of the three countries, ultimately laying the foundation for the establishment of a maritime court and a maritime law enforcement team. Without these two international cooperative organizations, the Japanese Navy would not be able to implement its southward strategy in a proper manner.

In particular, the Reform Society within the Navy understood Hayashi Shin-yi's intentions from the beginning. Once the Maritime Court and the Maritime Law Enforcement Team were established, Japan would have an excuse to have the indigenous regimes of Bali and Sulawesi apply to join, thereby legally obtaining maritime law enforcement rights in the South China Sea through the transfer of power from these indigenous regimes.

As a maritime superpower, the British established an overseas law enforcement system for the British Empire. The London High Court had jurisdiction over any disputes between British people and foreigners. Even disputes between two foreign citizens, as long as they were related to British property, fell under the jurisdiction of the London High Court.

The hegemony of the British Empire lay not only in the strength of the Royal Navy, but also in the strength of its judicial power. However, there was a loophole: the British judicial system was based on case law, which meant that the standards for maritime law enforcement in the British Empire were not fixed and were entirely determined by judges in London.

Therefore, although the British Empire controlled major seas around the world, this control was mainly based on the military deterrence of the Royal Fleet, rather than the constraints of legal provisions. Initially, the British did not recognize the Netherlands' legitimate sovereignty over all the islands of the East Indies; the British themselves had occupied places like Batavia. However, Britain's colonial focus was on the Indian subcontinent, and facing insufficient strength, Britain ultimately allowed the Dutch to retain the Dutch East Indies colony.

With the initial completion of the Industrial Revolution in various European countries, the hegemony of the British Empire was seriously challenged in Europe. At this time, British expansionism began to decline, and the idea of ​​establishing an international order with a balance of power in various regions gained mainstream recognition within Britain. Under this trend of thought, tacitly allowing the Netherlands to bring the East Indies under its rule in order to prevent Germany, the United States, and Japan from occupying the islands became Britain's diplomatic policy in Southeast Asia.

However, the uncertainties in British diplomacy, the weakness of the Netherlands itself, and the rapid growth of emerging powers such as Germany, the United States, and Japan meant that the legitimacy of the Netherlands' attempt to completely bring the Dutch East Indies under its rule was actually quite insufficient.

Germany and the United States were mainly under pressure from the British Royal Fleet in Europe, so they had to be cautious about the Dutch expansionist policies in the East Indies. Japan, although far from Europe, was far weaker than other powers in terms of national strength, and naturally could not interfere with the Dutch actions without a reasonable excuse.

However, if a maritime court and maritime law enforcement team were established, and the indigenous regimes of Southeast Asia were persuaded to voluntarily cede power to the Asian Cooperation Organization, then Japan would have a legitimate pretext to intervene in Southeast Asian issues. This is also the basis for the Reform Society's complete endorsement of Hayashi Shin-yi's proposal for negotiations on the exclusive economic zones of the three countries. Although, on the surface, Japan actually lost some interests in these negotiations, since China and North Korea, without the strength to confront the Japanese navy, could not guarantee their maritime interests at all.

However, this negotiation gave the Japanese Navy a much broader scope, allowing it to expand its influence from the Northeast Asian waters, which were bound by the great powers, to the southern seas. Compared to the slight loss of fishing interests, the navy was naturally more concerned about breaking the blockade imposed on it by the great powers.

This is also why Lin Hsin-yi is not nervous about unfavorable voices in domestic public opinion, because it is necessary for the overall interests of the navy, not his personal wish. In order to ensure the future of the navy, the navy will naturally suppress the forces that are dissatisfied with the negotiations.

As Hayashi Shin-yoshi had predicted, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Imperial Household Department ultimately yielded to the Navy's insistence, given that the Navy's support was needed to suppress the Army's concessions on the Korean issue. They could not demand that the Navy resist the Army while simultaneously siding with the Army against the Navy. Moreover, Emperor Meiji's health had deteriorated further, and he needed stability in the domestic situation.

Therefore, Emperor Meiji rewarded the elder statesmen and senior ministers for their contributions in the Russo-Japanese War, elevating Ito, Yamagata, and others to the rank of duke. This was likely the last time Emperor Meiji promoted these elder statesmen and senior ministers. This was both a way of appeasing them and a way of preparing for his passing. Ito and other elder statesmen believed that Japan needed peace in the coming years to avoid major political turmoil.

The point made by Ito and other elder statesmen is that social contradictions within Japan are worsening, and the people are only forced to obey government decrees because of their reverence for the Emperor. While the Emperor is alive, the military can wage war without issue because of the Emperor's spiritual influence; in the event of war, at least the people will unite and obey the Emperor's will. However, if the Emperor's health suddenly deteriorates and Japan is engulfed in war, then social contradictions could erupt suddenly, and no one will be able to rally the people to lay down their arms and obey the government.

Yamagata Aritomo agreed with his old friend Ito on this point, because he knew that the Crown Prince's popularity among the people was far less than that of Emperor Meiji, and that the Crown Prince rarely appeared in front of the public and the military due to his illness, so people did not have a deep impression of him. If the Emperor's condition really worsened and there was an unspeakable outcome, then Japan really could not go to war, otherwise, if the morale of the military and the people collapsed, Japan would face an unprecedented crisis.

Due to the Emperor's poor health, the army had to abandon its attack on the navy and lost political support. Domestic criticism of the negotiations on the exclusive economic zones of the three countries had become meaningless, because public discontent could not be transformed into real political confrontation through effective channels.

At this time, the Toyo Keizai Shimbun suddenly published a series of reports accusing fishing vessels of their operations. These reports exposed how capitalists exploited and enslaved fishermen on these vessels. Those crew members who were tricked onto the ships were practically slaves. Overseers would often beat and scold crew members who failed to meet their quotas. Due to the special environment of deep-sea fishing vessels, crew members who fell ill could not receive treatment at all. Captains were also unwilling to return to port for sick crew members. As a result, many crew members who only had minor illnesses and injuries eventually lost their lives and limbs. The captains made a fortune, but the crew members gained almost nothing except for their injuries and illnesses.

These reports severely refuted the claims made by fishing capitalists that they were operating at sea for the benefit of the Japanese, and even subtly criticized the Japanese Navy for protecting these capitalists and suppressing rioting crew members. The reports conveyed only one message: without maritime order and rescue organizations, deep-sea fishing would only enrich capitalists while turning the poor into expendable resources on board. No matter how far Japanese fishing boats sailed, they would bring no benefit to the Japanese civilian population.

The publication of these reports, while provoking protests from some ronin, received a great response from the Japanese working class. The patriotic ronin's siege of the newspaper office was quickly stopped by workers' organizations, forcing the patriotic ronin to file a complaint with the police. The Toyo Keizai Shimbun was a newspaper opposed to the Emperor, run by extremists.

However, this complaint was quickly ignored. After all, the upper echelons of the Ministry of Home Affairs knew that the Toyo Keizai Shimbun was backed by the Arts Foundation, which represented the interests of the Navy and the Imperial Household Ministry. Accusing the Toyo Keizai Shimbun of opposing the Emperor was clearly inappropriate; it would be tantamount to accusing the Imperial Household Ministry and the Navy of opposing the Emperor. Even the Ministry of Home Affairs, as the highest-ranking government agency, could not withstand the pressure from the Imperial Household Ministry and the Navy.

The discussion about the issue of slave labor on deep-sea fishing vessels ultimately overshadowed the criticisms of the three countries' exclusive economic zones, and Japanese attention quickly shifted to condemning the zaibatsu's trampling of the law. The fact that fishing capitalists treated Japanese sailors like slaves was clearly a violation of Japanese law, but in the past, no one paid attention to this issue, and the navy supported the expansion of fishing capital. Therefore, this kind of thing, like the toxic water shores created by mining, was suppressed by the Japanese government and judicial institutions.

Frankly speaking, compared to the farmers who were poisoned by mining capitalists, the crew members on ocean-going fishing boats were actually more miserable, because the crew members had no powerful figures to speak for them. The reason why those villagers were able to get the support of legal professionals was that they were also landlords, so they had the support of landlords across the country, which is why they were able to fight against mining capitalists for more than ten years.

This time, the navy abandoned fishing capital itself, and the Japanese working class's sympathy for the crew members led to public concern for the crew members on the distant-water fishing vessels who were originally on the margins of society.

Why did the major conglomerates abandon these smaller assets, just like the navy? It was because Hayashi Shin-yi proposed a larger fishing plan involving the three countries. In Hayashi Shin-yi's plan, once the negotiations on the exclusive economic zones of the three countries were successful, Japan could reintegrate the deep-sea fishing industry of the three East Asian countries, then provide more and more advanced fishing boats and refrigerated transport ships to the fishing companies of the three countries, and establish modern food processing plants to sell to Asia.

Hayashi Shin-yi shifted the focus of the conglomerate from frontline fishing to industrial manufacturing that provides fishing boats and other equipment for the fishing industry. This made it unnecessary to compete with China and South Korea for fishing grounds. Increasing the scale of fishing in China and South Korea would be more beneficial to the development of Japanese industry.

Chapter 745

Author: Fuchun Mountain Residence Number: 5035 Comments: 0 Update Date: 2023-09-23 12:49:22

In late October 1909, the Sino-Korean Northeast Border Demarcation Agreement was formally signed. Japanese Minister to China, Ijuin Hikokichi, signed the agreement on behalf of the Korean Empire and the Japanese Empire. The Chinese representatives were Qin Lishan and Tang Shaoyi, and the representative of the people of the Northeast Korean region was Lee Sang-go.

Although Lee Sang-ko was a North Korean, he could only sign the supplementary agreement, representing the Korean Independence Army in a ceasefire with the Japanese army. This humiliated him, but he had no choice but to succumb to reality. Without China's support, North Korea could not even sit down to negotiate with the Japanese, let alone discuss an agreement to establish a special zone in Northeast China.

According to this agreement, the Japanese military at least acknowledged that the Northeast Plateau region belonged to the Korean autonomous area, and also ceded the coastline from Chongjin to Rajin, recognizing that ships from the Northeast Special Zone would be free from Japanese harassment at sea. This was unimaginable a year ago. Although Koreans longed to drive the Japanese out of their homeland, they also understood that the Japanese army and navy, which had defeated the Russians, were not forces that Korea could resist.

Even if the Japanese did not disband the armed forces of the Korean Empire, the entire Korean Empire's armed forces numbered only 28000, and only 5600 of them were new troops equipped with Russian weapons and implementing the Russian military system. Yi Hee raised the new army to defend his own power, not to strengthen Korea. Therefore, this army did not become a supportive force for the enlightenment of Korea, but instead became a military force to strengthen Yi Hee's power. This caused Korea to miss the window of opportunity after the First Sino-Japanese War when Japan was unable to expand outwards.

Although Lee Sang-go, who came from the Yangban class, was once a supporter of the monarchy, after the independence movement in northeastern Korea, he had to accept the fact that the autocratic monarchy restricted the freedom of the Korean people and their enthusiasm for resisting the Japanese invaders. The Japanese army used more than one division to suppress the awakening and resistance of the people in the sparsely populated northeastern region of Korea. In contrast, in the densely populated and economically prosperous south, the Japanese army could wipe out tens of thousands of militia members with just one or two battalions.

A comparison of the two leads to a clear conclusion: relying on the Yangban (the ruling class) to resist Japan's invasion of Korea without mobilizing the people's power will not bring freedom to the Korean people, except for establishing a few virtuous individuals. In fact, despotism has become the biggest accomplice of Japan's invasion of Korea. The so-called five traitors and seven villains are actually less harmful to the cause of Korean independence than Yi Hee (Korean Emperor Yi).

Having realized this, Lee Sang-go transformed from an opponent of Asian allianceism and laborism into a supporter, which enabled him to represent the Korean Independence Army in signing the armistice agreement, which was not yet fully supported within the army itself. Radicals and some royalists within the army did not want the war to end and attempted to continue fighting the Japanese until they withdrew from Korea.

Lee Sang-go could actually guess what these people were thinking: they were trying to ignite a war between China and Japan and find an opportunity for independence in such a conflict between great powers. However, this idea had long been criticized by Ahn Jung-geun, who believed that the tragedy of modern Korean history lay in the fact that the Enlightenment Party wanted to use Japan's power to break free from the control of the Qing Dynasty. As a result, they drove away a declining suzerain state, but attracted an even more ferocious beast.

Ahn Jung-geun pointed out that some members of the independence army are still obsessed with so-called foreign powers and refuse to acknowledge the power of their own workers. They believe that Koreans are incapable of liberating themselves and that a foreign master is needed to restore order to Korea. This order is the autocratic monarchy that the Joseon Dynasty has always used to suppress the vitality of the Korean people.

Ultimately, Ahn Jung-geun stated that the freedom of the Korean nation could only be achieved through the awakening and self-struggle of the Korean people, and it was impossible to wait for a liberator to descend from the sky. Having achieved victories in resisting the Japanese army's encirclement and suppression of the volunteer army in northern Korea, Ahn Jung-geun and his Workers' Party gained significant popularity among the Korean independence army and the people of the north. He was already seen by some Koreans as a national leader capable of leading Korea out of its colonial predicament.

Previously, the independence army generals who could stand up to Ahn Jung-geun, and the renowned Confucian scholars of North Korea, could no longer debate the independence path with Ahn Jung-geun. This was because the North Korean military and people only believed in Ahn Jung-geun, who could lead them to victory, and would not follow those nationalists who only knew how to make grand pronouncements.

These Korean nationalists always like to regard the achievements of the independence army as a victory for nationalism. But in fact, without the Workers' Party and the land reform policy, the nationalists could not even establish a solid base. Nationalism can indeed incite the Korean people to launch a resistance movement against the Japanese invaders, but such a movement is difficult to build a large organization and long-term combat capability due to the lack of material support. Without the ability to organize and fight for a long time, it is impossible to force a militaristic power like Japan to give up its invasion.

Therefore, although nationalists opposed Ahn Jung-geun, they could not break away from the military and political organization established by him. Previously, some nationalists opposed the land reform policy and the labor union. They even broke away from the independence army and started their own faction to fight against the Japanese army. However, these people were either wiped out by the Japanese army or surrendered and became collaborators with the Japanese.

Why would these nationalists, who were willing to sacrifice for the Korean people, surrender to Japan? Because from the beginning, their nationalism was about maintaining their own privileges and land property. Compared to the Workers' Party, although the Japanese deprived them of some privileges and property, they allowed them to retain the privileges of oppressing the Korean people and some land property. Of course, they would rather surrender to Japan than to the Workers' Party.

Therefore, the nationalists who remain in the independence army are either those who identify with laborism or those who know that nationalism is indeed no match for the Japanese invaders. For them, breaking with Ahn Jung-geun would be tantamount to suicide. Faced with Ahn Jung-geun's firm stance on the issue of peace talks, they have no choice but to back down and compromise.

Although the agreement did not meet the ideals of North Korean nationalists, it still gave the North Korean people an opportunity to develop their independence. Lee Sang-go signed his name with a mix of melancholy and hope.

Unlike the conflicted feelings of the North Koreans when they signed the agreement, the Chinese and Japanese representatives both breathed a sigh of relief when they signed. The Chinese representatives were relieved to have avoided war, while the Japanese representatives were relieved to have resolved the troublesome situation with North Korea.

Ijuin Hikoyoshi was Makino Nobuaki's brother-in-law and one of the younger generation of the Satsuma clique. Politically, he and Makino shared the same stance. In essence, Makino supported the navy, but hoped that the navy would support him rather than give him orders. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Makino wanted to achieve this.

However, at present, the new Satsuma clique is a new political force established with the navy at its core. This faction does not really value Satsuma origins and only shows superficial respect for the former Satsuma noble families. Politically, it completely ignores the political ideas of these noble families.

For example, regarding the issue of Saigo Takamori's status, apart from Saigo Takamori's direct descendants, other members of the Saigo family do not actually advocate a large-scale reversal of Saigo's verdict, in order to avoid provoking the Emperor, the Shimazu family, and the Okubo lineage.

When Saigo Tsugumichi was alive, he only talked about Saigo's achievements in the overthrow of the shogunate, and rarely talked about Saigo Takamori's political career. In fact, he drew a line between himself and Saigo Takamori's political line, indicating that he was not the successor of his brother's political ideals.

Saigo Tsugumichi could do this because he participated in the anti-shogunate movement alongside his brother. Therefore, even if he denied Saigo Takamori's political ideals, people would still acknowledge him as a representative of the Saigo family. This Saigo family refers to the family to which Saigo Takamori belonged, not the family of Saigo Tsugumichi and others.

After Saigo Tsugumichi's death, other members of the Saigo family wanted to sever ties with Saigo Takamori while simultaneously seeking to inherit his political legacy—a rather unrealistic expectation. In fact, after Saigo Tsugumichi's passing, the Saigo family's influence in the Navy plummeted. While Yamamoto Gonnohyōe was a close confidant of Saigo Tsugumichi, he did not consider himself the Saigo family's political representative; he maintained his own political stance.

However, Hayashi Shin-yi's sudden rise in the navy once again confirmed Saigo Takamori's contribution to the overthrow of the shogunate. However, although Hayashi Shin-yi admired Saigo Takamori, he did not believe that Saigo's descendants naturally represented Saigo Takamori's political ideology. Therefore, although Saigo Tsurudo's descendants received some benefits, they had no say in the navy and the new Satsuma clique.

The Saigo faction within the navy was actually the Reform Society organized by Hayashi Nobuyoshi. Under its strong political and economic policies, branches of the Satsuma clique, such as Okubo and Shimazu, had no choice but to bow down and join the New Satsuma faction. As for some extreme diehards, they had actually been excluded by the New Satsuma clique and could no longer obtain political resources in the name of the Satsuma clique.

In this situation, even Makino Nobuaki, as the leader of the younger generation, could not contend with the will of the new Satsuma clique. This time, the will of the new Satsuma clique is the will of the navy, to promote peace between Japan and China, and on this basis, to establish the Asian Cooperation Organization, thereby establishing a new Asian order led by Japan.

This new approach is naturally much stronger than the diplomatic independence and Asian balance diplomacy advocated by the elite bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The diplomatic independence advocated by the elite bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has never received the support of the military and the elder statesmen. Every prime minister has opposed the so-called independent diplomatic propositions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, even though in principle the Minister of Foreign Affairs is directly appointed by the Emperor rather than the prime minister.

However, compared to the controversy surrounding diplomatic independence, the biggest crisis for the elite bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the defeat of the concept of a balanced diplomacy in Asia by the concept of a new Asian order. The diplomatic philosophy of the elite bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is essentially a complete copy of that of Britain. Just as Britain pursued a balance-of-power diplomacy in Europe, the bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also developed a balanced diplomacy for East Asia.

Before Komura Jutaro, the elite bureaucrats of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could recite international law fluently, but they couldn't explain what a balanced diplomacy in East Asia was. It wasn't until Komura Jutaro became the Minister of Foreign Affairs and formulated a Japanese diplomacy subordinate to British diplomacy that the concept of a balanced diplomacy in East Asia was initially explained.

In short, Foreign Minister Komura believed that Britain's position as the world's hegemon was unshakeable, and therefore Britain's balance of power diplomacy around the world was also unshakeable. Japan was powerless to challenge the world order established by Britain, so it could only stand on Britain's side to maintain this world order and thus find its international status under this British-dominated international order.

Foreign Minister Komura, guided by this diplomatic philosophy, pursued a diplomatic path that led Japan to counter Russian expansion in the Far East, ultimately resulting in war between Japan and Russia. Although Japan did receive British support and defeat Russia, this victory proved to be a heavy burden for Japan, as it gained no benefit from the war.

Japan did indeed uphold the order that Britain sought in the Far East, but without disrupting this order, Japan could not obtain sufficient benefits from Korea and China to compensate for its sacrifices. Therefore, the peace treaty signed after the East Asian War effectively declared the bankruptcy of the Omura Line, as Japan had replaced Russia as the challenger to the British order in the Far East.

At this time, the Navy proposed a new Asian order based on Sino-Japanese cooperation, which was essentially about drawing China and other Asian nations into a confrontation with the British-established Asian order, thereby creating opportunities for Japan's expansion. While elite bureaucrats within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the Navy's new approach to be playing with fire—because they consistently believed that Britain's global hegemony was unchallenged—the Army shared a similar view. Therefore, the prevailing opinion within both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Army was to carve up the interests of the relatively weaker China within the British-dominated order, rather than directly challenging the international order established by Britain.

However, this claim also failed with the outbreak of the Chien Island incident. Army and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials realized that it was far too late for Japan to try to digest and swallow China, let alone North Korea. At this time, Japan's attempts to seize Chinese territory would only allow China to further turn the Korean Peninsula into a chaotic war zone, making it difficult for Japan to maintain its rule over the Korean Peninsula.

The new Asian order of Japan-China cooperation, led by the navy, has finally overridden the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' continental balance policy and become the guiding principle of this cabinet's foreign policy. The naval military exercises held in September 2009 among the three East Asian countries, which were met with strong protests from the German government, also stimulated domestic public opinion in support of Japan-China peace. This forced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to comply with public opinion and expedite negotiations with China on the North Korean border issue.

For a Foreign Ministry bureaucrat like Hikokichi Ijuin, it was natural to know that the German government's strong protest to Japan and China was indeed because Japan had provoked Germany first. Shortly after the start of the naval military exercises, the Japanese Navy submitted the second phase of the exercise plan, stating that a certain country had launched an invasion against China from a port in Shandong, attempting to occupy the Shandong region. The Combined Fleet used force to stop the country in order to protect peace in East Asia.

After Britain surrendered Weihaiwei, the only remaining leased territory in Shandong by the major powers was Jiaozhou Bay, leased by Germany. This meant that the exercise directly treated Germany as a hostile force. The Germans, invited to participate, naturally could not tolerate such humiliation. German warships announced their withdrawal from the exercise and submitted a report to Berlin, immediately igniting public anger in Germany.

However, the Japanese public had no idea what the specifics of the military exercises were. They only knew that the Germans had once again threatened Japan with war. Under this provocation, the Japanese did not seek the so-called truth, but instead brought up the old story of the Triple Intervention and the return of Liaodong Peninsula, believing that Germany was trying to threaten Japan with war again and to expand its interests in China.

Fueled by this nationalistic sentiment, opposition to Germany naturally became the primary demand of the Japanese people. Consequently, many Japanese who had previously opposed Sino-Japanese peace shifted their stance, believing that Japan's main enemy remained the Western powers. Germany was a major European power second only to Britain, and the Japanese knew they couldn't defeat it. Although backed by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the consequences of China siding with Germany were unbearable for Japan. Therefore, the Japanese quickly regained their rationality, and support for peace in East Asia became the mainstream opinion domestically.

For Britain and France, the naval military exercises held by Japan and China, which designated Germany as an enemy, were welcomed. The US and Russia, however, did not want to see such a scenario. For these two powers, which lacked the concrete power to intervene in the Far East, using the principle of unity among the great powers to safeguard their interests in East Asia was the only means. Therefore, neither country wanted to see a scenario of East Asia uniting against imperialism and colonialism.

However, the conflict between Britain and France and Germany was irreconcilable. France believed that if it did not fight a war with Germany to wash away the shame of the Franco-Prussian War, it would be unable to defeat Germany alone once Britain's foreign policy shifted. Britain, on the other hand, believed that if it did not support France in fighting Germany now, France would not dare to fight Germany once Russia withdrew from the Tripartite Pact. In that case, the balance of power in Europe might get out of control, and Germany, once stabilized on both the east and west, would definitely launch an attack on India. At that time, Britain would have to fight a land war with Germany in India, a war that Britain could not win.

Therefore, Britain and France had been inciting anti-German sentiment domestically and ignoring the efforts of German pacifists to oppose war in Europe. Under such circumstances, the principle of balance of power in East Asia had to give way to actions aimed at curbing German overseas power. Japan's naval exercises targeting Germany were recognized by Britain and France. Britain assured the Japanese government that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be effective if Germany declared war on Japan. However, Britain did not announce this diplomatic principle to the German government.

The Beiyang clique was initially fearful of angering Germany, but Yuan Shikai soon realized that this incident might break the cooperative relationship between Germany and Wuhan. Therefore, he ordered the ambassador to Germany to explain to Emperor Wilhelm that the Beiyang clique did not support the military exercise and that it was entirely Wuhan's idea.

Chapter 746

Author: Fuchun Mountain Residence Number: 4619 Comments: 0 Update Date: 2023-09-24 12:55:00

Yuan Shikai's gesture of goodwill towards Emperor Wilhelm was not valued by the emperor, because in Wilhelm's eyes, Germany's interests in the Far East were far less important than its interests in the Mediterranean region. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire was considered far more important than the former Eastern empire. Of course, this was only the view of the emperor and some of the older generation of nobles around him.

In fact, estimates suggest that Germany's total exports in 1909 increased by approximately 25-30% compared to 1908, with more than half of that growth coming from exports to China. According to some German economists, if China's development continues at its current rapid pace, Germany's share of global exports should equal or surpass that of the British Empire within ten years. And if we consider only the British domestic export share, it has already surpassed Britain this year or next.

What Wilhelm II considered the dominant Eastern empire was actually becoming an increasingly important trading partner for the German business community. Former Krupp chairman Friedrich Alfred Krupp and a group of German industrialists advocated for solidifying relations with China to secure a significant share of trade in this emerging market for German industry.

This Sino-Japanese naval military exercise did not damage the perception of China among German industrial and financial circles. Even without the German-Chinese Chamber of Commerce led by Krupp defending China, most German business people believed that this military exercise in the East could not be considered a provocation by China against Germany, but rather an anti-German conspiracy launched by Britain and Japan in the East.

Since the signing of the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian enactments, Germans have considered an anti-German alliance to have been formed on the European continent. In fact, Germans could accept the Franco-Russian opposition to Germany, since Germany's unification was largely due to British support, as Britain needed a Central European nation to prevent Europe from being partitioned by France, Russia, and Austria.

Germany's largest trading partner was the British Empire, which is why there were so many pro-British people in Germany. When Wilhelm II sent a telegram to congratulate South African President Dranwaz on thwarting the British plot, German public opinion did not initially support the emperor, because Germans generally believed that the world's hegemon was still Britain, and Germany did not have the power to challenge Britain.

The telegram controversy eventually ended with Wilhelm II writing a letter of apology to Queen Victoria. The Germans did not consider it a disgrace, but anti-German sentiment in Britain did indeed arouse dissatisfaction among the German people. Many Germans believed that it was merely an inappropriate act by the emperor, but the British smashing German shops in London and attacking German sailors at the docks were clearly an offense to the German people, and the British did not apologize for it.

Following the Telegraph Incident, Britain, France, and Russia concluded an entente. For citizens of an industrialized nation who had completed secondary education, it was clear that the entente was intended to target only Germany. Therefore, while some German intellectuals called for Anglo-German reconciliation to defuse the war crisis, the Germans had already begun preparing for war.

Under the shadow of war in Europe, the German people naturally paid no attention to the problems in the East, instead viewing them as yet another British conspiracy against Germany. Yuan Shikai's goodwill towards Emperor Wilhelm was ignored, because both the German government and the German military believed that while the Beiyang clique might not have been involved in this conspiracy against Germany, their goodwill was meaningless to Germany, as the Beiyang clique would never fight against the British Empire for Germany's sake.

In contrast, the Wuhan regime was far more important to Germany than any other political force within China, and even more so than Japan. This was because Wuhan had demonstrated courage against Britain in the Tibet-India War, and showcased China's war potential in the war against Russia. This meant that, regardless of Wuhan's true intentions, its strength was something Germany needed. Moreover, the radio station established between Germany and Wuhan in Tibet had begun trial operations, successfully connecting Berlin with Qingdao and the Pacific islands.

This meant that Wuhan had effectively become a crucial transit communication hub for Germany's East Asian colonies and fleet, and the British could not sever this connection because they could not allow India to be threatened with war. Therefore, the German government and military advised the Emperor not to damage the good relationship between Germany and Wuhan, otherwise Germany would lose a reliable foothold in the Far East.

Imperial Navy Minister Tirpitz, a naval expansionist who had previously regarded Qingdao and Shandong as eastern strongholds, reversed his previous stance on Qingdao and Shandong before the Emperor, saying: "Shandong and Qingdao are indeed important to the Imperial Navy, but the good relations between China and the Empire are even more important to the Imperial Navy. If I really have to make a choice, I would rather give up Qingdao than give up the friendship with Wuhan."

Wilhelm II was surprised and pointed out to his close friend, "You did not seem to advocate this view on the Qingdao issue in the past. You believed that only by holding Qingdao and occupying Shandong could the Empire protect its interests in the Far East."

Tirpitz also frankly admitted his mistake: "Yes, that's what I thought in the past, but at that time the Chinese did not show the ability and wisdom to defend themselves. But now the situation is different. The Chinese have not only gained the support of the Indian people, but also the friendship of Japan, which means that we have become the second Russia."